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THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES. By Karl S. Popper, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. v, 732. $7.50.
DURING the Years of the Cold War it is well to remember the ancient
Chinese proverb: the first result of any war is that the adversaries adopt
each other's vices.
Today when the Open Society and its Enemies are locked in a bitter struggle,
it is painful to record how, step by step, each antagonist takes on the worst
features of its adversary. The Communist totalitarians who once denounced
capitalism for its huge expenditures on armaments, for its imperial control
of "backward" areas, for its long working hours, for its government control
of labor unions, and for the wide disparities in its income structure, now
copy each of the vices they once denounced. And the champions of the Open
Society so quickly forget how they once denounced the totalitarianism of
peace-time conscription, state control of wages and prices, government by
executive order, iron curtains blocking the once-free movement of human
beings across national boundaries, and all the techniques that have been
developed since the Inquisition and the Star Chamber to eradicate what the
Japanese Government used to call Dangerous Thoughts.
Why do so many professed champions of the Open Society rush so precipi-
tately to embrace the weapons and the uniform of the enemy? Is it because
they secretly admire the supposed efficiency of totalitarianism more than they
hate its brutality? Is it because of a "treason of the intellectuals?" Have
those to whom the Open Society looks for leadership and inspiration sold
their souls to the Devil? And have the great idealistic philosophers from
Plato to Hegel served as the Devil's salesmen to dignify intellectual treason?
It is to questions of this sort that Karl Popper has devoted the logical and
historical studies that make up his 732-page treatise on The Open Society
and Its Enemies. Whether or not one agrees with the drift of his argument
one is compelled to admire the vigor and sincerity with which Popper drives
towards the heart of fundamental ideological struggles in which our future
is being shaped. For at least he sees, as Heine saw,1 that "proud men of
action . . . are nothing but unconscious instruments of the men of thought,"
the Platos, Lockes, Rousseaus, Hegels, and Marxes who stand outside the
battles of their times and, in their studies, arrange the battles of future
generations.
Basically, it is Popper's contention that the totalitarian assault upon the
Open Society was plotted by Plato, Hegel, Marx, and their followers. By
glorifying power, defending lies, and undermining free inquiry, these so-called
idealists have corrupted the youth of our generation and of many generations
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dead and gone. To vindicate the cause of freedom it is therefore necessary
to expose these evil geniuses and to clean up the intellectual garbage dumps
they have left behind; that, at least, is Popper's general thesis, which makes
a reasonably coherent volume of what he himself describes, with some justice,
as "merely scattered marginal notes" to a history of historicism.2
Plato, according to Popper's analysis, is the perennial enemy of progress,
since he "teaches that change is evil, and that rest is divine."3  The Greeks,
Popper observes, were "the first to make the step from tribalism to human-
itarianism ' 4 and were thus the spiritual founders of our western civilization.
At the time when Athens was at the center of the world's trade in goods
and ideas, and Greek science was breaking the chains of ancient tribal mis-
trusts and superstitions, "Plato was longing for the lost unity of tribal life." 5
Inspired by his "hatred of the society in which he was living,"6 Plato elabo-
rated a political program which "far from being morally superior to total-
itarianism, is fundamentally identical with it.''7 Plato then "libels his great
teacher" by putting into the mouth of Socrates the elaborate scheme of
trickery by which the rulers of a Platonic Republic or any other dictatorship
of race or class can manage to keep human masses under subjection. In-
spired by his hatred of the democratic tendencies of his native land, Plato
was "led to defend lying, political miracles, tabooistic superstition, the sup-
pression of truth, and ultimately, brutal violence."9  "The theory of the
Inquisition, more especially, can be described as purely Platonic."' 10
The evil influence of Plato, according to our genial author, gave backbone
to "medieval authoritarianism"" but needed renewing at about the time when
American and French revolutions were popularizing the idea that the people
could shape their own futures if they were willing to devote lives and risk
death in the cause of freedom. At this juncture Hegel appeared on the scene
to give a new quirk to the philosophical defense of authoritarianism and
tribalism. The reality of change could no longer be denied, but change itself
could be glorified as a superhuman world-force before which human reason
must abdicate.
By disqualifying human reason and rational criticism of prevailing forces,
Hegel was able to discredit all criticism of his employer, the Prussian Gov-
ernment. The "identity of Hegelian historicism with the philosophy of














quick and simple changes by which Communism and Fascism replace each
other in the sagas of 20th century Realpolitik.
Although Popper is too much restrained by modem literary conventions
to express his own frank opinion of Hegel he does express enthusiastic
concurrence in the comment of Schopenhauer, "who had the pleasure of
knowing Hegel personally and . . . drew the following excellent picture of
the master:
'Hegel, installed from above, by the powers that be, as the certified
Great Philosopher, was a flat-headed, insipid, nauseating, illiterate
charlatan, who reached the pinnacle of audacity in scribbling together
and dishing up the craziest mystifying nonsense. This nonsense has
been noisily proclaimed as immortal wisdom by mercenary followers
and readily accepted as such by all fools, who thus joined into as
perfect a chorus of admiration as had ever been heard before. The
extensive field of spiritual influence with which Hegel was furnished
by those in power has enabled him to achieve the intellectual corrup-
tion of a whole generation.' "113
Although Marx reacted violently to Hegel's notion of world-history as
an evolutionary unfolding of ideas, and insisted that the real world was
material, that Hegel had stood it on its head, and that the new philosophy of
dialectical materialism could turn it right side up, Marx succeeded in copying
the worst vices of the Hegelian philosophy. Thus, in spite of "his keen
sociological insight into the conditions of his own time, and of his invincible
humanitarianism and sense of justice," 14 Marx and his followers, Lenin and
Stalin, ended up with a world-view that suppresses human reason and the
rational criticism of prevailing forces.
Such is the main course of the author's diatribe; along the way he polishes
off the "antidemocratic" Heraclitus, 15 the "intelligence-destroying influence
of Aristotle,"'16 the "windbag Fichte,"'17 and the "irrationalist authorities"
Whitehead and Toynbee.'8
It would be easy, but scarcely illuminating, to dismiss all this with the
words of Emerson, "Why so hot, little man?" or with Emerson's remark to
young Holmes who, sharing some of Popper's distrust of grandiloquence,
polished off Plato in a student paper and received Emerson's crisp comment:
"When you strike at a king you must kill him."
It is likely that Plato, Hegel and Marx will survive the Popper attack and
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perspective to those who seek a faint ray of light on the muddy conflicts of
our world and the dark outlines of our future. For what was important
about these thinkers was not the platitudes of Plato nor the mystic muddles
in which Hegel's arguments generally drop out of sight nor the cocksure
prophecies of Marx and his followers.
What was signficant about these philosophers was the questions they
formulated, questions which have given new dimensions to our thinking.
It is to Plato, as Popper admits, that we largely owe "that great spiritual
revolution, the invention of critical discussion."'19 It is to Hegel that we
chiefly owe our modern concern with the development of ideas and the mean-
ing of history, and our emancipation from the long era in which a history
of art or philosophy was a formless catalogue or chronicle of unrelated
individuals and incidents. It is to Marx that we largely owe the critical
question that is addressed today to every legal or social institution: How
does it affect the productive forces of society and the livelihood of the common
man? And having asked explosive questions that neither they nor their
contemporaries could answer, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx
will continue to challenge the thoughts and energies of generations yet unborn.
And those who are anxious to understand the rhythms and patterns of ideas
to which the world's hobnailed boots now move and by which atoms and
governments disintegrate will have to seek out in the writings of these men
something more than Mr. Popper found in them.
An inspired American philosopher and teacher of philosophers, Wilmon
Sheldon, has justly observed that philosophers are generally right in what
they affirm of their own vision and generally wrong in what they deny of
the vision of others. It may very well be that Popper's own vision of a
social ethics that frankly faces the realities of the present and the uncertainties
of the future is more significant than his appraisal of the merits and demerits
of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. That vision is presented with courage and
patience. It reminds us that we can make our own future, and that in the
process of building a better society we can pursue the methods of science
if our hypotheses are specific enough to allow pragmatic tests. It shows
how much easier it is to shape pragmatic tests to the elimination of specific
social evils than to the creation of Utopias.2 0 It reminds us that in the struggle
to preserve and extend the moral values of the Open Society none of us can
escape a moral responsibility for the consequences of our action or inaction.
It reminds us that (as Plato and Aristotle pointed out long ago) power
corrupts those who wield it, and the conclusion follows that we cannot win
security by surrendering our freedoms. For the state to which we sell free-
dom for security may take from us, along with our freedom, even that little
security which we had at the start of the bargain. Thus Popper focuses




attention on a question which European political thinkers from Plato to Stalin
have consistently overlooked in their search for The Perfect State, the ques-
tion of how the evil that governments do, by reason of the corruption of
power, may be practically minimized. That question is not original with
Popper. The whole American tradition of disrespect for constituted authority
makes this question central in our political thinking and this helps to explain
why the United States has prospered so greatly under so many incompetent
presidents and governors. But Popper writes out of the heart of the European
political tradition, in which respect for authority goes hand in hand with the
assumption that government is an exercise of superior wisdom or morality.
That Popper and a few other political scientists, here and abroad, have come
to doubt that assumption is a good sign.
It did not take philosophers like Plato or Marx to invent the theory that
the state can do no wrong: this is the natural assumption of every oriental
despotism. What Plato and Marx (with Hegel's unintended help) did was
to develop a technique of reasoning by which any existing regime could be
criticized. If we are to improve these techniques of rational criticism of
political institutions, as Popper most earnestly desires, we cannot afford to
ignore the forms of the dialogue and the dialectic that Plato and Marx
perfected. That Plato traced the logical presuppositions of tribalism and
Marx the logical presuppositions of economic dictatorship may help us to
avoid the dangers of both.
Not many years ago, a materialist-minded member of the U.S. Senate
grasped his Bible and thundered: "It has been said on the highest authority:
Skin for skin, yea all that a man hath
will he give for his life."
That was a bad mistake, because his adversary in the debate promptly
replied that he had always suspected that the orator regarded the devil as
his highest authority and that it cleared the atmosphere now to have this
admission made publicly on the floor of the Senate.
If Scripture can quote Satan in a moral drama like the Book of Job
without becoming Satanic, if a novelist like Cervantes can write of the hero
of La Mancha without becoming Quixotic, then is it not possible for a
philosopher like Plato to explore the implications of tribalism without becom-
ing identified with one or more of the characters in his dramatic and explosive
dialogues? And when Marx saw what his followers had done with his
insights, did he not have every right to thank God that he was not a Marxist?
This reviewer makes no pretense of knowing enough of Greek history to
criticize Popper's opinion of what Plato really thought about the characters
in his dialogues and their diverging views. But is that question of any real
importance? Do we need to know why Einstein turned to physics in order
to appreciate the classic beauty of his mass-energy formula? To trace the
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logical and historical consequences of ideas we loathe is not a loathsome
task but one of the greatest services that any lover of wisdom can ever per-
form. Despite Popper's loathing for his predecessors he contributes most to
our understanding when he walks in Platonic and Marxian paths, not sub-
missively as some Platonists and Marxists have done, but courageously,
smiling at temporarily prevailing authorities with the same smile that curled
the lips of Plato or Karl Marx.
FELIX S. COHENt
CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY: By A. James Casner and W. Barton Leach.
Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1950. Pp. xliii, 1326. $9.00.
HERE is an impressive, skillfully done monument, marking with great
clarity the present position of enlightened conservatives in the war between
embattled teachers of property law and Professor Myres McDougal.
McDougal has exacted some slight concessions from the enemy, mostly tagged
on at the end of a long book. Greater concessions than actually materialize
to training for policy making are implied in an admonition to law freshmen-
prepare yourselves "to provide a very large proportion of the national leader-
ship at all levels of authority."' But, in his preface of shop talk for pro-
fessors, Mr. Casner reassures teachers that direct training for public policy
making is not his or Professor Leach's goal. "In our view", he says, "the
first-year property course is basically and primarily a private-law course
dealing with the representation of private clients. ' 2 This is definitely not a
book from which to teach "the ideology of state planning"-the object, a
Harvard law graduate has recently charged, of Yale's first year property
course.
3
What the Book Covers
This is a fat book; its coverage is tremendous. The first year student
meets cases and information previously concealed from him until he took
second or third year courses, (if he could work them in) like mortgages,
servitudes, vendor-purchaser, and conveyancing. The best job of text writing
ever done in a law student's book, and a strong-willed refusal to use cases
that do not raise big questions suitable for a survey course, make this ambitious
coverage possible. Whether Professor Casner covers all 1300 pages of the
book with his students is not disclosed. Professor Leach, in his now mildly
famous dissenting preface, admits that he leaves out the personal property
material.
tVisiting Lecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1. p. 14
2. p. ix.




These personal property problems take up the first four parts of the book,
a total of 237 pages.4 Many property teachers will be delighted to meet here
old friends, familiar to generations of law students, in wild animal, what-is-
possession, when is a gift not a gift, and who is a bona fide purchaser cases.
The real estate part of the book spreads itself over the remaining 1050 pages
and proceeds, in general, along functional5 (though narrow) lines "to provide
[the student] with a practical grasp of the law governing commercial trans-
actions in land."6
In contrast personal property problems are mostly approached through the
old conceptionalistic button game of possession, possession, who's got posses-
sion. There is a brief textual description of the pledge, the conditional sale and
the chattel mortgage,7 but there is no real attempt to give the student a "prac-
tical grasp" of the wide variety of important commercial dealings in personal
property. It has been left for someone else to save the hoary personal property
course from ultimate ignoble burial by preparing survey materials functionally
acquainting the student with the modern sale, chattel mortgage, pledge, con-
ditional sale, trust receipt, bank transaction, and stock transfer.
The real estate materials open with readable, and, amazing as it may seem,
interesting, text about the historical roots of our real property law, types of
estates and future interests, and concurrent ownership. Here it becomes
especially evident that this book is a far cry from the Harvard case books of
old, where a case and nothing but a case would do to illustrate a point no
matter how minor or outmoded. Professors Casner and Leach have brought
us half way back to pre-Langdell days when law students were text trained.
A major difference exists, however, between the dull, uninspired texts of old
and the delightfully readable stuff Casner and Leach have concocted. They
have relied on others for that part of the text which covers taxes and insur-
ance for property lawyers and abstracts of titie. But the rest of the text,
hundreds of interestingly written pages in all, is their own. At several points
in the book there are slugs of text 50 pages and more in length uninterrupted
by a reported case. Though problems are provided, professors used to re-
laxing while students recite on cases are going to find it hard going to get
through this material with their poise intact.
The concurrent estates material is approached intelligently, from the point
of view of an estate planner. Here is the neatest application of tax law to
property transfer problems in the book. The full-dress chapter on the "ABC
of Taxes for Property Lawyers" is disappointingly unspecific. It might
better have been called the "ABC of Taxes for Everyone with No Particular
Attention to Problems of the Property Lawyer." It would have been better
if most of the tax discussion, like that relating to concurrent estates, had been
4. This includes a short eight page section on adverse possession of land.
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tied to specific transfer problems. (Professor Gardner's contribution, "In-
surance for Property Lawyers" is much more helpful, because it is tied to
problems with which the student wrestles in other parts of the book).
The landlord-tenant material is pretty orthodox except for an exciting
chapter vividly recounting the pulling and hauling that went into the ham-
mering out of an actual lease. The end product is then printed in full for the
student to ponder. Some students may also ponder about why, since a 21
year lease was involved, data about prospects for the neighborhood, price
curves, prospects for land use regulation, etc., were not presented.
The modern land transaction is largely described through clearly written
text about the statute of frauds, the binder and installment land contract,
marketable title and the mortgage. Cases are provided, though not in profusion,
to illustrate the operation of the recording system and deed delivery and
covenant problems. The HOLC, FHA and the federal farm credit agencies
and their impact on real estate financing and the mortgage market are ignored.
There is, say the authors, no serious requirement for uniformity in land
law "for there is no interstate commerce in land."' This is certainly not true
of the FHA insured mortgage and the authors would have done well to
describe briefly the increasingly interstate character of the mortgage market
and the increasing need for uniform rules of mortgage law because of it.
Besides, professors who use the book out in my part of the country will want
to supplement, substantially, the skimpy treatment of the installment land
contract and to throw this frequently used financing device into detailed
contrast with the mortgage. This contrast should emphasize the sharp
differences in remedies available to the creditor in each case, a task that the
authors relegate (I suspect with their fingers crossed) to the procedure pro-
fessor. Of course, professors out here have long since become accustomed
to supplementing eastern case books which ignore the special property prob-
lems of the farmer, especially those of the agricultural share lease. This book
suffers from the same big city myopia as the others.
Beginning way back at page 985 the authors have saluted Professor
McDougal with a chapter on "Controlling the Use of Land," which consists
of 107 pages on covenants and only 27 devoted to three cases on land use
legislation,--the Euclid and another 25 year old Zoning case and a third case
relating to the mining of anthracite coal. To call a chapter with this content,
"Controlling the Use of Land" is a mite presumptuous.
The final chapters which relate to easements, licenses and rights incident
to the ownership of land are orthodox and not especially noteworthy.
A very useful device is included in the book, if the students find it,-cita-
tions to articles are arranged in a table of articles under the same general




What the Book Does Not Cover
Whether viewed from the point of view of the authors, whose primary
objective is the training of counselers and conveyancers for private clients,
or from the equally valid point of view of the law teacher who believes that
he has an important obligation to train also for the public service and to
educate lawyer-citizens for community and law reform leadership, this book
does not, by any means, sufficiently acquaint the student with "the gradual
narrowing of the area in which property rights can be created and trans-
ferred solely by private agreement, and the expansion of the area in which
Government either lays down certain basic rules for private agreements . . .
or takes complete control of the field .... 9
Mr. Casner in his preface is just plain wrong when he says, "Perhaps it
will be otherwise in the future, [and aren't we training our students for
that?] but at the present time zoning ordinances and a few rules forbidding
certain types of restraints and conditions are all the conveyancer has to contend
with."' 0 Let him read, in his own book, the meticulously done section on
examination of title by Richard B. Johnson, obviously, as the authors say,
an experienced and highly competent Massachusetts conveyancer. Mr.
Johnson, in addition to zoning ordinances, is concerned about (1) the Soldiers
and Sailors Civil Relief Act; (2) tax delinquency statutes, tax titles and their
inadequacy; (3) liens imposed by government for taxes and other charges;
(4) the important matter of subdivision planning and approval and (5)
building codes. In other parts of the country he might, simply as a con-
veyancer, also be concerned with soil conservation district contracts with
land owners; housing codes; sanitation codes; statewide administrative regu-
lation of building; grazing permits; water use permits; special state and local
requirements for development of land along lakes and streams; increasing
intervention of the federal and state governments in the water pollution field;
zoning which bars practically all uses except forestry; regulation through the
guise of covenants or conditions when publicly owned land is sold or rented
for private use; state laws setting minimum lot sizes for the open country;
policies and practices in connection with the resale for private use of tax
delinquent land; government policies and trends as they affect or will probably
affect parties to long term leases; constitutional restraints on the ownership
of agricultural land by corporations or on the long term leasing of farm land;
limited access highway laws; timber cutting regulations, etc. etc.
After one has worked with problems created by district attorneys, who,
out of disinterest, flub the drafting and enactment of county zoning ordinances;
after one has repeatedly heard of district attorneys who refuse to enforce
forestry zoning, because a man has a "right" to live on his own isolated sub-
marginal land regardless of costs to school, community or family health; after
9. A Report on the Yale Law Curriculum, 37 A.B.A. J. 655, 656 (1951).
10. p. ix.
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one has faced blight caused by proud and brazen evasions of subdivision con-
trols invented by otherwise reputable lawyers; after one has seen lawyers
fight controls which would prevent death, economic waste and aesthetic
mutilation along our highways, he should not be expected to be completely
complacent about the failure of American law schools to lift their property
students out of the 19th century, away from fallacious notions of absolute
property rights and into the mid-twentieth century, face to face with its urgent
problems of close living, land planning, disgraceful land use and industrial
relocation.
But, you say, must the first year property teacher teach all of this land use
stuff and the "essentials" too? True, property professors are being asked to
pack more and more of their teaching into the first year. In view of this, how
can they work land use materials into their already crowded courses. Maybe
the property teachers need to stage a counterattack and get more time. I am
sure that most of us need to take a fresh look at what we have been consider-
ing "essentials." Sitting down with Casner and Leach at the right elbow and
McDougal and Haber at the left will, I believe, greatly facilitate this re-
analysis. Working with a community's tough zoning, subdivision control
and other land use problems will also help. Here is a final suggestion,-an
expensive one for your students. Why not use both Casner-Leach and
McDougal-Haber in your course? Use some of that beautiful Casner-Leach
text to get quickly across what, after reanalysis, you are convinced are his-
torical and doctrinal necessities. Probably you'll want to use some of their
recording system cases too. But get to zoning, land use planning and limita-
tions on use through McDougal-Haber.
J. H. BETSCHERt
tProfessor of Law, University of Wisconsin School of Law.
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